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Lessons from Germany: Improving on the U.S.
Model for Corporate Governance
Tien Glaub'
1. INTRODUCTION

Since the collapse of Enron, a cloud of suspicion and mistrust has
loomed over corporate America. 1 The Enron debacle proved to be
just the tip of the corporate fraud iceberg.2 Evidence of fraud in all
major industries exposed the "hidden fundamental weaknesses" of
many American companies. 3 Enron's shareholders, typical of millions
of defrauded investors, had no idea what was happening behind the
scenes until the company's $90 stock became worthless. 4 The
scandals scarred both the lives of individual investors, who saw their
wealth disappear overnight, and capital markets as a whole."
These scandals highlighted the ineffectiveness of corporate
governance rules throughout the United States. Since 200 I, the
U.S. legislature and public have cried out for changes to corporate
governance rules to prevent continued abuses. 6 In response to the
crisis, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the most
significant public company securities legislation since the Securities
Act anp the Securities Exchange Act of the 1930s? On the public

* LLM candidate, The John Marshall Law School (2009).
1. David S. Ruder, Lessons from Enron: Director & Lawyer Monitoring
(Oct.
10,
2002)
(unpublished
manuscript,
available
at
Responsibilities
http://www.law.IH>rthwestern.edu/pr<lfessionaled/d(lCuments/Ruder_Lessons _Enron.pdf).
2. Cherie J. Owen, Comment, Board Games: Germany's Monopoly on Two-Tier System
o( Corporate GOJ'ernance and Why Post-En ron u.s. Would Benefit from Its Adoption, 22 PENN
ST. INT'!. L. REV. 167, 169 (2003) (listing WoridCom, Adelphia, Tyco, Global Crossing, and
K-Mart as other prominent examples).
3. Carrie Johnson & Brooke A. Masters, Fraud Cases Focus on Top Executives, WASH.
POST, Jan, 18,2005, at AOI.
4. Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate & Securities Law After
ElIron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 453-54 (2002).
5. Del Quentin Wilber, Turbulence O,Jer Executive Pay: Airline Workers Question
Leaders' Bonuses After Rank-and-File Pay Cuts, WASH. POST, May 22, 2007, at DOL
6. See infra note 7.
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (2002) (codified
at scattered sections of 11,15,18,28, and 29 U.S.c.) (increasing accounting transparency of
corporate audit systems, mandating independence in audits, setting ethical standards f(lr
accounting and key executives, enhancing financial disclosure to prevent self~dealing, insider
trading, abusive pension plans, and increasing liability f(lr t:lilure to comply).
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side, the American Bar Association urged reform of the governance
structure of American corporations and autonomy of the board of
directors. s Some legal commentators advocated adoption of a
modified version of the German two-tier board structure as the best
model for corporate governance. l) Others remained loyal to the
traditional one-tier board, after which the American corporate
governance system is modeled. 10
Based on the current post-Sarbanes-Oxley state of U.S. corporate
governance, this Comment recommends American adoption of some
characteristics of the German governance model and rejection of
others. After a short historical background of comparative corporate
governance, Part II recommends that the American board
incorporate two components of the German model: its two-tier
board structure and its externally controlled auditing procedure. Part
III advocates that the American board diverge from the German
model with regard to two other components by granting more
authority to the supervIsory board and eliminating labor
partICIpation in corporate governance. American corporate
governance can be greatly improved through selective adoption of
the German two-tier board structure and externally controlled
auditing procedures, while further legislation can address concerns
with the German model by increasing the authority of the
supervisory board and eliminating labor participation.
II. COMPONENTS OF THE GERMAN MODEL TO BE ADOPTED
While the goal of any corporate governance scheme is to ensure
the corporation's well being, considerable debate continues to exist
over whether the German two-tier board is superior to the American
one-tier system. II Rather than a wholesale adoption of the German
two-tier board model, this Part suggests that the American board
incorporate the German board structure and audit system and

8. AMERICAN BAR ASSOClATION, PRELIMINARY REPORT 01' THE ABA TASK FORCE or-;
COIU'ORATE RESPONSlllILITY, (2002), available at Imp:/ /www.abanet.org/buslaw/
c, lrporatnesp' ll1si bility / prdimary _rep' >n. pdf
9. See Lauren J. Aste, Rejiwmincq French Corporate GIIl'ernance: A Return to the TwoTier Board', 32 GEO. WASI-1. J. INT'L L. & ECON. I (1999) (comparing dunges of tile French
one-tier board model to the German two-tier board).
10. See Florian Stamm, A Comparative Study of MonitorinH of ManaiTement in German
and U.S. Corporations After Sarbanes-Oxley: Where Are the German Enrons, WorldComs, and
Tycos?, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 813 (2004).
11. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEl;AL STlJl). 233,252 (2002).

236

SPRING

2009

Lessons from Germany

explains how these components will improve corporate governance
in America.

A. Two-Tier Board Structure
One major difference between American and German business
models is the structure of a corporation's board of governance. 12 The
one-tier board, which has been adopted by a majority of European
countries and the United States, has roots stretching back to the
structures of European companies incorporated in the 17'h century.13
The one-tier board includes both executive directors who manage
the business of the corporation and non-executive directors who
indirectly oversee management of the corporation and involve
themselves in only the corporation's major transactions. 14 The
executive directors hire corporate officers (such as president, vicepresident and treasurer) to manage the corporation's day-to-day
activities. 15
The two-tier model has an upper tier, the supervisory board,
which oversees a lower tier of management composed of senior
executives. 16 Unlike the one-tier board, the German supervisory
board typically has no authority even in major transactions of the
corporation, although specific transactions may be subject to the
approval of the supervisory board if the articles of the corporation so
provide. 17 Because of its supervisory nature, members are excluded
from the management board. This exclusion gives the German board
an advantage over the self-supervising relationship between the nonexecutive and the executive directors in the American one-tier board.
There are two major differences between the two-tier board and
one-tier boards. First, because the board of directors oversees the
senior executives who are often the executive directors themselves,

12. Owen, supra note 2, at 175.
13. KJaus J. Hopt & Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe: Recent Developments of
Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Ita~y,
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 18,2004), available at
http://ssrn.C<lIn/abstract=487944.
14. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(.1) (1999) (stating that business and affairs of every
corporation "shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may
otherwise provided in this c1upter or in its certificate of incorporation"); MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 8.0 I (1984) (stating that all corporation powers "shall be exercised by or under the
authority of its boards of directors ... ").
I S. Owen, supra note 2, at 172.
16. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 5.
17. Id.
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the one-tier board provides opportunities for self-dealing. IH For
example, Ken Lay was both CEO and chairman of the board of
directors of Enron, which created an atmosphere of inadequate
oversight. It) The two-tier board structure excludes all executives from
its supervisory board and thus the supervisory board cannot become
directly involved in managing the company.20 This separated
structure and its associated efficiencies, now adopted in many
European countries, allows tor more independent supervision of the
management. 21 Another advantage of the two-tier structure is
procedural efficiency. For instance, the supervisory board can hold
private meetings for matters such as management compliance and
compensation. 22 The separate supervisory board structure offers
advantages compared to that of the combined one-tier board such as
a clearer scope of duties and a better application of any measures of a
director's independence.23 The smaller size of the supervisory board
also facilitates compliance with the British "independence test"24 or
American civil and criminal liabilities laws. 25
One weakness of the American system is difficultly in
enforcement of liabilities laws. The recent repetition of Enron-type
scandals in companies across the American markets demonstrated
that American liabilities laws did not deter "arrogant, greedy, selfish
and heartless" executives from violating their fiduciary duties. 26
Additionally, rules excluding executive directors from compensation
committees or including a majority of independent directors on the
one-tier board are criticized as being both ineffective and a cause of
the public's "distrust of corporate managers. ,,27 This is arguably
because independent directors will "rarely if ever act to change the
management."n Adoption of the German two-tier board structure
18. Owen, supra note 2, at 185.
19. Id. at 185 n.12l.
20. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 5.
2l. Id.
22. Id.
23. Owen, supra note 2, at 184.
24. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 12, at 13 (listing seven indicators of director's
independence trom British Combined Code).
25. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.33 (2003).
26. Wilber, supra note 5.
27. Martin Lipton, Corporate GIIJ'crnance in the AiTe of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. Pl\.
L. REV. I, 49 (1987) (noting that the American Law Institute's approach to corporate
governance continues to retlect distrust of corporate managers).
28. Altred F. Conard, Comparatil'e Law: The SupenJision 11' Corporate ManalTement: A
Comparison of Developments in European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. 1,.
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will be a signifIcant step toward a truly independent supervisory
board and will help overcome problems with conflicts of interest.
B. Audit System
Compared to other countries' auditing systems, the German
system has a number of significant advantages. The primary
advantage is that the two-tier structure allows the German
supervisory board to have complete independence in performing its
audits. The German audit system strikes a balance between the
Italian version of the two-tier model and the British and American
one-tier models.
Italian corporate law takes audits for listed companies very
seriously.29 It mandates that the supervisory board serve an internal
auditing function while the management board runs the company.30
In the United States, Enron's collapse exposed the conflicts of
interest involved in corporate auditing and prompted the enactment
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 31 The Act does not change the board
structure, but focuses on protecting investors by "improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the
securities laws,,,32 including the empowerment and protection of
whistleblowers.33 Even so, the criminal liability provided in the Act
to punish whistle blower retaliators is "in some ways more limited
than the corresponding civil liability provisions. ,,34
In Britain, legislators proposed removal of the shareholders'
power to choose auditors and fix their remuneration, giving this
power instead to their one-tier board. 35 Hence, British rules create a
potential conflict of interest in which the directors have power to

REV. 1459, 1472 (1984) (stating that a director "must be willing to take on the unpleasant
assignments that can go with the position, such as getting rid of incompetent management,"
and that "ltjhe ultimate protest ofa director, of course, is to resign trom the board").
29. Legislative Decree No. 58 (Feb. 24,1998); Gazz. Ult: No. 71 (Mar. 26,1998). An
English translation of the law is available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/
test<)~unic<)~eng.pdf

30. Id. art. 149.
31. SelignlJn, supra note 4, at 515~16.
32. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 pmb!., Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (2002).
33. Id. § 1107.
34. Dennis Riock & Jonathan Hoft~ Whistleb/owers Protection Under The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 2003, at 2, al!ailable at http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/
article /Ri, )ckH, )006260 3. pdf
35. Secretary of State t,)r Trade and Industry, Modernising Company Law, Presented to
Parliament by Command of Her M~ljesty (July 2002).
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hire and fire auditors who would audit the directors themselves or
their fellow board members.
By contrast, in the German two-tier board model, the
supervisory board handles the audit completely and exclusively.36
Auditors submit their report directly to the supervisory board and
participate in meetings concerning approval of annual accounts. 37
This structure ensures a truly independent audit process by
eliminating potential conflicts of interest. The German audit system
also maintains the auditing report's contldentiality and preserves any
evidence of managerial misbehavior. 3H
One concern with the German system is that exclusion of the
supervisory board from management may limit its right to obtain
information directly and prevent members from developing an
"objective picture of the company's performance.,,3<J This concern is
based on the mistaken assumption that obtaining information
directly from the management board is the only way to learn about a
company's performance. To the contrary, board members can glean
information regarding company performance through due diligence
and regular meetings with employees, corporate auditors, customers,
government auditors, suppliers, or creditors and can exercise
significant control over the flow of information by simply being
actively involved. 40
Adoption of the German audit system would help eliminate
potential conflicts of interest inherent in the American system by
allowing for an independent audit. Concerns about the supervisory
board's limited right of access to company information may be
overcome through the board's active oversight or by increasing
board authority as explained below.
III. COMPONENTS OF THE GERMAN MODEL TO BE AVOIDED

Despite the advantages afforded by
governance model, there have been several
adopt the American one-tier model. 41
Ackermann, the leader of Deutsche Bank,

36. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 10.
37. [d.
38. [d. at 6-8.
39. [d. at 9.
40. [d.
41. [d. at 9-10.
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the United States, has diverged from the two-tier model by taking
posItIons on both the supervisory and executive boards. 42
Nevertheless, mainstream European corporate governance continues
to move toward elimination of mandated employee board
participation and a clearer distinction between the two tiers of the
corporate board. 43 As discussed above, this Comment concurs with
the general European trend and suggests that the American board
should adopt the two-tier structure and the German auditing system.
However, it should diverge from the German model by increasing
the authority of its supervisory board and eliminating employee
participation.
A. Supervisory Board Authority

There are two concerns with the authority of the supervisory
board in the German two-tier board model. The first, as addressed in
Part II, is the limitation of the supervisory board's right to
information regarding company performance. Without sufficient
information, the supervisory board may not have enough power to
take a stand against the management. 44 Paradoxically, the second
concern revolves around the possibility that the supervisory board
will wield too much power-a balance of power that can negatively
interfere with management's business judgment. 45 While the balance
of power should be continually assessed, the best way to resolve
concerns regarding supervisory board authority is by granting it
increased authority.
Although the supervisory board can access essential information
from various parties external to the corporation, without a formal
grant of power from the legislature it may encounter significant
resistance from these entities. A greater extension of power will

42. Ackermann's application of the American concepts of executive compensation to the
German system brought him into the center of Germany's most high-profile corruption case in
decades. SeeMa1l1zcsmannDefendantsNotGuilzy.British Broad. Corp. (22 July, 2004),
aJlailable at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3915717.stm (reporting bonus payments
worth $74 million (£40 million) to executives); see also Igor Reichlin, On Trial: Whither
Germany' The Trial of Detttsche Rank CEO Ackermann Reflects a Battle Oller Whether German
Companies Can Rccome More Global, The Chief Executive, Dec. 2003, available at
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1GI-111737855.html.
43. See, e,a., Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 16-18.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Aste, supra note 9, at 36 (reciting Paul Le Cannu's concern that the "power
imbalance" between the two boards resulted from the supervisory board's greater power over
the management).
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enable it to extract all information necessary to effectively carry out
its audit function. Whereas a lack of explicit authority may
discourage cooperation between the supervisory board and the
previously mentioned entities, a formal grant of power would serve
to enhance collaborative efforts between the supervisory board and
those entities privy to important information.
Additionally, though purported to be strictly separate from
corporate management, the lack of suHicient authority in the
German model may render the German supervisory board a mere
"Potemkin Village," similar to the purported independence of
American board directors. 46 In fact, Gerd Weisskirchen, a senior
legislator of the German Social Democratic Party, commented on
the 2008 Volkswagen corporate corruption scandal: "We're in a
painful transition from the old corporate Germany toward one with a
new face.,,47 Referring to the alignment of the German corporate
governance model with the American one-tier board model, the
"new face," as the Director of the Volkswagen Center for
Automotive Research predicted,4X would be a Potemkin fa<;ade made
of ineffective independent directors and would "block judicial
control of mismanagement. ,,49
When greater power is bestowed upon the supervisory board,
the second concern that it has too much authority becomes
paramount. But a system of checks and balances adequately resolves
this concern. 50 Indeed, governments could more effectively
implement these checks and balances under a separate two-tier
structure where the supervisory board has authority independent
from the executives, so that executives do not otherwise "set, mark,
and report on their own exam papers."Sl
Nevertheless, American proponents of the one-tier board model
46. Conard, supra note 28, at 1468 (citing Victor Brudney, The Independent Directors:
Heavenly Ci~y or Potemkin Villacqe? 95 Harv. L. Rev. 597 (1982)). "Heavenly City" is an
allusion to the dream of a rational society, while "Potemkin Village" is an allusion to false
facades constructed by General Potemkin to please Catherine the Great in her tours of the
countryside. Id.
47. Mark Landler, German Court Returns First Jail Term in VW Corruption Scandal,
INT'L HERALD TIUB., Feb. 22, 2008, http://w\\.w.iht.com/articles/2008/02/22/business/
vw.php.
48. Id. (citing the director's fear that they were not addressing the underlying issues).
49. Conard, supra note 28, at 1468.
50. Owen,supranote2,at 184.
51. Roberto Herrera-Lim, The Case jiJr Two-Tier Boards in the Modern Corporation,
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission
of
PakistJn
(2009),
aJ'ailable
at
http://w\\ow.sec.gov.pk/rc/RoleOfDi rect, lfS/CaseT\\'0- Tier B, lards. pdf.
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consider the two-tier model outdated. 52 For instance, in a 1997
corporate symposium, Patrick Speeckaert, then Managing Director
of the International Division of Morrow & Company, stated that
"European corporate governance is where American corporate
governance was five to seven years ago. ,,53 Regardless of whether Mr.
Speeckaert's perception was based on the two-tier board model as a
whole or, more specifically, its mandatory employee participation, he
was unsuccessful in personally proving the superiority of the one-tier
board model due to his own corporate failures. 54
Although valid concerns regarding authority of the supervisory
board in the German two-tier model exist, a robust system of checks
and balances is an effective deterrent against the threat of too much
power. At the same time, this system allows for the increased
authority necessary for the supervisory board to effectively carry out
its auditing function. 55 Even though a system of checks and balances
is theoretically possible within the framework of the American onetier model, the German two-tier board model, where real authority is
reserved for the upper tier, is likely a better conduit for the effective
implementation of a balanced system of power distribution.
B. Employee Participation

The German board model allows employee partIcIpation in
corporate governance. The United States would be wise to avoid
such schemes. In Germany, employees participate in corporate
governance by electing half of the members of the upper-tier board
of directors. 56 This type of employee participation or worker
consultation can facilitate the t10w of information needed for an
independent advisory board,57 thereby making it more effective.
However, this system would not work well in the United States due

52. See, ceq., Patrick Speeckaert, Corporate G()J7ernance in Europe, 2 FOIU)HAM FIN. SEC.
& TAX L. FOIWM 31 (1997).
53. Id.
54. See Odyssey Pictures Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Dec. 27, 2004),
al'ailable at http://w\\w.secint().com/dI2PMe.llz.htm. Until Speeckaert's 2004 resignation
as director "without comment," Odyssey sufiered a number of tinancial setbacks. Odyssey
Pictures Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 15, 2008), available at
http://\\,ww.secint().com/d 13Ka8.tl.htm?Find=Speeckaert&Line =258#Line258.
55. Herrer,l- Lim, supra note 51.
56. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History jiJr Corporate
LaJV, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 445 (2001).
57. DIRK VAN GERVEN & PAUL STORM, THE EUROPEAN COMPANY 17 (Cambridge
University Press, 1st ed. 2006) (noting the structural effects of employee participation).
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to its business culture and labor policies such as employment-at-will
and collective bargaining. ox
Some observers have criticized the ineffectiveness of labor
participation in corporate governance. 5\1 Others have predicted that
participation will become a European trend, as many European states
are satisfied with labor's involvement. 60 The European Union
Directive deals with the split by leaving decisions on labor
participation to individual states. 61
A country's history and culture create different priorities in its
legal system. for instance, German employee participation in
corporate governance and unionism is deeply ingrained in the
country's culture, with historical roots dating back to the Weimar
Republic of thel920s. 62 In the United States, on the other hand, a
system has developed that includes shareholders and lenders in its
corporate governance. 63 U.S. corporations must also embrace a
national free-market economyM and a flexible labor law system,
which allows an employer to dismiss an employee at any time for "a
good reason, a bad reason, or for no reason at all. ,,65
Thus, in the American system, employees do not have voting
rights in the corporation unless they themselves are shareholders. A
lack of equity interest excludes employees from voting in the
corporate general election in order to ensure the integrity of
corporate governance. As such, mandated employee participation in
electing the board would not mesh with American free market
principles. Finally, required employee participation would conflict
58. Tom Werner, The Common Law Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Current Exceptions
Employees, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 291, 293 (1994).
59. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 22 (citing recent scandals in F.R.G. as evidence of
co-determination as ineffective both as a guarantee against excessive remuneration of
management and as a safeguard against costly strikes).
60. Hildegard Waschke, Workers' Participation in ManalJement in the Nine European
Community Countries, 2 COMP. LAB. L. 83,101 (1977) (describing workers' participation in
management in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom); see Dieter Sadowski, Joachim Junkes & Sabine
Lindenthal, Employees and Corporate Governance: Germany: the German Model '!f' Corporate &
Labor Governance, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POl.'Y J. 33,66 (2000) (stating that codetermination
may promote positive changes).
61. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 22 (observing that the 5'" Directive leaves the
decision on labor participation to member states' discretion).
62. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 56, at 444.
63. Stamm, supra note 10, at 834.
64. See Marleen O'Connor, Labor's Role in the American Corporate GOl'ernance
Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'y J. 97 (2000).
65. Werner, supra note 58.
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with U.S. labor laws that allow corporations to fire an employee for
any non-discriminatory reason. Employers might exercise this power
to control whether and which employees actually participated in
corporate governance.
Several countries have discovered that employee and labor union
partiCIpation in corporate governance cannot coexist. Italian,
Belgian, and french unions came to suspect that employee
participation diluted their unions' impact on management. 66 In the
United States, employee participation attracted attention in the
1970s, when adversarial unionism lost its role in dealing with labor
contracting. 67 The attention soon waned, but, unlike calls for
employee participation, unions did not disappear. 68 Indeed, they
maintain a significant role in contractual negotiations and collective
bargaining.69
Unions and employees participating in corporate governance
affect each other in a variety of ways. First, employee participation
undermines the role of the union if an employee can work in tandem
with the boss on corporate governance issues without union
involvement. Second, the union may taint the independence of
employee board members because they may "qualifY as being free
from any direct business relationship but are bound to the union's
members, i.e. the employees.,,7o
Although the employee participation system has a unique
historical significance in Germany, its application to American
corporate governance is complicated by differences in American
culture and labor policy concepts. Furthermore, the potential
conflicts inherent in employee union affiliations may harm rather
than benefit the American board's independence. Accordingly, the
United States should avoid adopting the employee participation
aspects of the German board model.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Paul Davis has observed: "There is no 'one best' system of
corporate governance. Rather, each system has different

66. Waschke, supra, note 60, at 97.
67. See O'Connor, supra note 64.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Hopt & Leyens, supra note 13, at 22 (stating that these members would not pass
the directors' indepeI1lknce test).
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advantages."71 Compared to the existing U.S.one-tier model, the
German two-tier board better equips the supervisory board to check
and balance corporate management. The German audit system is
superior because it produces an authentic picture of company
performance without any conflict of interests. Despite these two
distinct advantages, the German supervisory board does not have
enough authority to ensure its independence. The German model
also mandates employee participation, which would likely not work
in the American business environment. For these reasons, the United
States should adopt the German two-tier board structure and its
audit system but should avoid German policies of limited supervisory
board authority and employee participation in corporate governance.
By implementing these aspects of the German system, the American
corporate governance system could more properly balance the many
competing interests necessary to secure a corporation's success.

71. Paul Davies, Employee Representation & Corporate Law RejiJrm: A Comment from
the United Kingdom, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'y J. 135, 136 (2000).
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